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-PUBLIC HOUSING AS Al INSTRUMENT OF INCOME REDISTRIBUTION:
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT
1972
John P. Huttman and Elizabeth D. Huttman
California State University, San Francisco and Hayward
Housing possesses certain characteristics which qualify it for an
instrumental role in income redistribution policy. Housing is a
commodity which for the poor is generally deficient in quality and
frequently inadequate in quantity even at modest quality levels.
The poor pay a substantial share of their income for housing. The
majority of families with incomes under four thousand dollars spend
over one-fourth of their total income on housing, while most of
those with incomes under two thousand dollars annually normally
spend over one-third for housing, as compared with less than one-
sixth of average family income devoted to housing in the case of
the total population.1 And the poor are generally concentrated, in
part because of a lack of cheap housing elsewhere, in neighborhoods
where the pathology of poverty reinforces itself. In such areas
public facilities, including schools, health care services, police
protection and sanitation, are generally inferior.2 Minority person-
s generally are compelled to pay prices for housing that reflect the
racially discriminatory attitudes of whites.3 Poor minority persons,
therefore, may be obtaining even less housing for their outlays of
money and deriving even less in the way of public services as a
result. Some of the economic costs incurred by the poor or by public
agencies on their behalf as a result of inadequate housing may be
indirectly reflected in expenditures for medical care. Social costs
of deficient housing may be identified with poverty behavior pattern-
s, such as the incidence of juvenile delinquency.4
Housing is one item among a stock of high priority economic and
social goods with which the poor are inadequately endowed. The
list includes sufficient food, medical care and education facilities,
among many goods and services.5 The provision of housing by public
agencies, in some contrast to most of the items of priority for the
poor which may be provided by this source, commits the intervention
of government for a period of extended duration because of the char-
acteristic durability of housing.6 Unlike the alternative goods and
services which government might furnish to the poor, a housing pro-
gram once embarked upon employs resources which are not easily re-
allocated for other purposes and represents a commitment duration of
the useful life of the housing, in many cases. The amounts involved
may be substantial even for a modest number of poverty family
recipients.7
The private market by itself offers slight prospects for resolving
the supply problems of quality housing for the poor. Among the many
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factors contributing to the remoteness of a market type solution
to the problem of housing the poor, are the characteristics associ-
ated with the location of housing and the structure of the housing
supply industry. Location figures importantly in decisions relat-
ing to all housing, of course, but perhaps it is even a more critic-
al factor in the case of location of housing for the poor in urban
areas. Typically, there exists potentially more lucrative alternat-
ive uses for the land occupied by much of the low rent housing stock.
8
However, particularly in urban core areas, this land can often be
efficiently redeveloped in relatively large blocks and sometimes
only in huge tracts. Urban renewal has played a key role in the
contraction of the housing supply available to the poor. 9 Private
investors and the financial institutions which facilitate their
acquisition and development of residential property are motivated
by profit incentives while low-income housing situated on valuable
tracts of central city area land represents an unprofitable form of
investment.10
The operation of existing low-income housing is no more attractive
to investors than the construction of new units to house the poor.
The severe constraints upon the ability of the poor to pay for hous-
ing do not effect the increasing costs encountered by landlords. In
New York City, over one-third the cost of operation of low-income
housing is represented by maintenance, while about one-fourth is real
estate taxes and the residual represents interest and other forms of
return to capital. Maintenance is the only significant item eligible
for substantial reduction and to do so will appreciably reduce the
quality and usable lifetime of the housing. When the savings through
reduced maintenance are not sufficient to make the operation profit-
able the next, and the last, step is the accumulation of tax arrears
on the property, after which the property is abandoned and defaulted
to the city. The process inevitably leads to a reduction in the
stock of housing for the poor.l l
The filter-down process is inadequate to offset the contraction caus-
ed by intolerable deterioration of low-rent housing, or its demolit-
ion or abandonment by landlords. Overall, there is no shortage of
housing in the United States. Aside from cases of mis-matching hous-
ing and people by location, due to migration and other factors, it iz
only the poor who actually experience a serious deficiency of supply
of the housing they can afford.1 2 No investors are interested on their
own in building or operating low-rent housing. Government assistance
is a required stimulant to attract and maintain investor interest in
such properties. Without financial aid to investors from public
sources, the filter-down process is likely to deteriorate to trickle-
down. Further, an increasing amount of the total stock of housing
in the United States, and particularly of that built in the post
World War Two period, has been single family owner-occupied units.
Typically, this is located physically distant from the poor and well
beyond their socio-economic horizons. Generally, the poor, unassist-
ed, are unqualified to be owners. And many of the poor are minorit-
ies who have been effectively deprived of opportunities to locate in
many areas by discriminatory behavior of home owners, neighborhood
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associations, financial institutions and even government agencies.
The increment of annual housing stock expansion, on the average, is
less than two percent, which is sufficient to provide for household
expansion but inadequate to re lace existing deteriorating and demol-
ished residences for the poor. 3
Presented with the dilemma that the poor cannot pay for a basic
economic good like housing in amounts sufficient to generate increas-
ed market supply, pressure for government intervention is generated.
Government is not a stranger to participation in the housing market,
but until recent years this activity had been nearly exclusively on
behalf of the more affluent. The FHA and VA mortgage guarantee pro-
grams have facilitated home ownership for approximately nine million
middle class Americans since initiation in 1934, through provision
of low interest and low downpayment requirements. Urban renewal,
where it has resulted in additional housing units, has frequently
provided urban housing for the more affluent at the expense of the
poor. More low-income housing has been demolished than constructed
under urban renewal, with a resultant negative effect for the poor.14
American society tends to identify two categories of poor as eligible
for assistance. The one group includes the incapacitated, composed
of the aged and infirm and households headed tr females who are immobi-
lized from securing paid employment by reason of their work commit-
ment in rearing their children. The condition or circumstances of
these persons make them ineligible to participate effectively in the
labor force. Their sources of income may include charitable donat-
ions and limited assistance from relatives and others but, generally,
their main means of support comes from public agencies. Another
group experiencing poverty includes those considered employable but
who are involuntarily unemployed and also the low-income employed.
Even when fully employed, their incomes fall at or below that defin-
ed as the poverty level. The residual of the poor - a small fract-
ion but, nonetheless, the focus of inordinate attention - includes
the voluntarily unemployed, those who reject employment available to
them or who have deferred entry into the labor market for various
motives, including additional education. Whether this last group
should receive public assistance has been a matter of considerable
controversey, obscuring the issues involved in the case of the
majority of poor the incapacitated and the low-income, low-product-
ivity employed.1 9 The majority of the poor, through no choice of
their own, have slight capacity to effectively generate market
demand for housing of adequate quality in sufficient quantity.
Cash transfers to the poor is perhaps the most obvious solution, in
that it is simple and direct and would allow the low-income family
to make its own market choice. However, there are serious object-
ions to this. For one thing, even if the direct grants are intended
primarily for improvement of the housing situation of the poor, there
is little assurance the money will be spent that way. Possibilities
of divergent consumption patterns with expanded shares of the increas-
ed income to, say, entertainment instead of housing, even though not
in fact practiced by the poor, may be sufficient to convince the
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more affluent and their public officials to restrain the levels of
assistance. In practice, where such programs as AFDC dispense direct
grants to recipients, these are most notable for their inadequacy in
meeting all but the most basic needs at subsistence levels.
1 6 Suppos-
ed work disincentives appear to be another common grounds for object-
ion to direct grants. An unmentioned but implied objection undoubt-
edly originates in the fear of the more affluent that direct grants
to the poor would, in effect, make their neighborhoods more access-
ible to the poor. Then, too, direct grants are not specific and the
public more strongly identifies the social injustice involved in
inequities as regards such items as housing or food than, say, cloth-
ing, automobiles or entertainment. Direct grants without specificity
of purpose would be allocated to poor families only at levels
inadequate to purchase satisfactory housing, even if the bulk of
funds were so dedicated.1 7
An alternative to direct cash payments that is equally as apparent as
a solution is the direct provision of housing to the poor: in short,
public housing. In practice, in the United States, the evidence
offers slight consolation to public housing advocates. Notoriety
surrounds a number of large scale public housing projects, such as
Pruitt-Igoe in Saint Louis. New York City, which has one-half the
total of public housing units in the United States, finds them to
generally be high crime areas, with highly stigmatized residents who
have slight positive identity with their projects. Rates of deteri-
oration, partly induced by vandalism and tenant neglect, reinforce
the una tractiveness of these large scale city public housing pro-
jects.lA Units in smaller communities, including suburbs of New
York City, such as White Plains, have, in contrast, achieved satis-
factory living conditions for tenants. Smaller units, widely dis-
persed among private and, ideally, higher income housing, tend to
present acceptable solutions to public housing needs of low-income
families. However, the hostility generated by the more affluent in
such areas as the Forest Hills section of New York over the threat
of public housing sites in their neighborhoods suggests that the
capacity for such dispersal is probably quite limited.
A variation on the public housing pattern with its concentration of
low-income residents may be seen as a mixture of social and economic
elements. Conceivably, for one thing, the middle class might be
more receptive to their officials appropriating funds for programs
from which they might anticipate personal benefit. Presently estab-
lished residents of areas adjacent to or in the vicinity of public
housing sites are likely to view such developments more benignly if
the project tenants more closely resemble themselves. However, in
practice, the desired socio-economic heterogeneity frequently fails
to occur. Government subsidized housing programs in Britain, intend-
ed mainly for lower-income wage earners, but without income restrict-
ions, in fact serve, for the most part, the more affluent members of
the working class and, also, many white collar workers in higher job
categories.1 9 The new town housing in Britain tends to attract large
numbers of higher paid workers, since the employment categories in
new towns often fail to match the qualifications of working members
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of low-income families. The Dutch new town of Lelystad, where housing
eligibility is closely related to job placement, and where govern-
ment is attempting to encourage establishment of the more productive,
high technolo& industries, has few low skilled, low-income workers
in residence.2
An alternative to having the poor rent housing, whether from public
or from private landlords, is to have them become homeowners. This
would presumably give the poor a vested interest in society, as
property owners, subduing anti-social characteristics which might
otherwise surface. It would give the poor family an incentive to
maintain its housing. The stability of payments under ownership
would tend to insulate the low-income family from speculative or
other unpredictable causes of housing price increases to which ten-
ants are frequently subjected. Section 235 of the 1968 Housing Act,
the home ownership subsidy program which HUD has now suspended under
the 'housing moratorium', was intended to do just that. Under the
program, housing was developed by private builders. In addition to
new housing, older units which were determined to meet the standards
established by HUD were also included. Private lending institutions
financed the Section 235 housing, with mortgages insured at the
market rate by FHA. The procedure involved subsidy-interest payments
to the mortgage holding institution sufficient to cover the differ-
ence between the amount paid by the mortgagee, limited to twenty
percent of adjusted income, and the total cost of the debt service.
The total debt service cost represented interest, amortization of
principal, taxes, insurance, mortgage insurance, and service fees.
This program, which had involved approximately one-quarter million
housing starts in 1970 and 1971, had come under severe criticism for
the quality of the housing acquired by the poor in many cases. The
financial arrangements frequently exceeded the capacity of the poor
to pay, particularly when coupled with the costs of repairs and
maintenance. Long-range limitations of this program involve the
scarcity of housing conveniently located and suitably priced for
low income families and the reluctance of government to commit the
necessarily large scale resources required for long-term periods.
This type of program does not appear to be a feasible solution to
the housing problems of the poor, since it largely still confines
them to low-income neighborhoods and, in many cases, unsatisfactory
housing, while they become saddled with mortgage debt. 2 1
Section 236 of the 1968 Housing Act, which like Section 235 has
been suspended under the 'housing moratorium', was intended to stimu-
late nonprofit or limited profit housing with its rent supplement
program. It incorporated some of the characteristic features of
public housing and was designed to offer incentives to private
builders and lending institutions. Under this program, rent obligat-
ions were defined on the basis of tenant income. In the rent supple-
ment program, which assisted tenants incapable of fully meeting rent
obligations in housing developed as a result of federal incentives,
the lower rent limits were established at twenty-five percent of
family income. This ratio of rent to income, arbitrarily advanced,
was intended to provide evidence of the serious desire of lower
income families to secure better housing. It also presumably reflected
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their intent to utilize and maintain it properly. The more contro-
versial limitation involved was that of the upper income limit set
for eligibility for residence in Section 236 projects. After con-
siderable debate among the officials involved and in Congress, pro-
posals for setting upper limits at one hundred thirty percent of the
income eligibility entry levels for public housing were accepted.
The income levels set tended to be very close to median family in-
comes in most localities although, in fact, provisions had been
incorporated for establishing special allowances, such as that of
raising ceilings by three hundred dollars for each additional child
of an applicant family. In 1970 and 1971, the first two years of
operation of the program, nearly one-quarter million families were
housed under the provisions of Section 236. Few of these families
were in the lowest-income categories so that Section 236 made slight
contribution to the solution of their housing problems.
2 2
The poor may not have appreciably benefited from the housing construct-
ed under the Section 236 program, but it proved to be a lucrative
activity for building contractors and financial institutions.
Section 236 housing has been developed, owned and administered by
non-profit or limited profit sponsoring bodies. The projects were
financed through conventional lending sources and the mortgages
were insured by the FHA at the prevailing market rate. However, the
mortgagee only paid at an interest rate of one percent, with HUD
defraying the difference. Units completed tended to be rather expen-
sive, as this was more profitable to both contractors and lending
institutions. HUD acquiesced since officials were anxious to have as
many units produced as quickly as possible to prove the feasibility
of the program. Since rents under the program were established on
the basis of mortgage calculations at one percent interest or at
twenty-five percent of adjusted income, rental levels could be made
fairly high for most tenants. The prospects for high rent levels
in Section 236 projects acted to reduce neighborhood hostility to such
development, but it also made the housing largely inaccessible to
the pooro2 3
A housing allowance program offers some advantages over alternative
schemes in terms of making quality housing available to the poor.
Clearly, some alternatives have to be rejected as possible solutions
because they simply fail to provide for an adequate supply of low in-
come quality housing. Direct income transfers would probably not
provide for adequate amounts of money for low-income families to claim
decent housing, even if none of it were to be mis-allocated for low
priority items by the recipients. Public housing as a possible alter-
native has largely failed in that the quality and the context make
for an unsatisfactory residential situation. Similarly, subsidies
to buildings rather than people offer slight prospects for resolving
the housing needs of low-income families since the overall stock of
housing appears to be adequate and, therefore, its expansion is in no
apparent need of artificial stimulation. And making subsidized
housing more attractive by encouraging greater socio-economic mix
has generally resulted in subsidizing the middle class, frequently to
the detriment of the poor. In the same vein, schemes for home-owner-
ship by the poor have frequently saddled them with housing burdens
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at least as formidible as those from which it was intended they be
liberated.
A housing allowance to occupants rather than buildings can discrim-
inate clearly on the basis of income, so that public funds will not
be mis-directed to the more well-to-do. The housing allowance to
occupants would offer low-income families freedom of choice as to
location and type of housing. While in practice their choice would
be constrained by limitations of allowances, availability of housing
in general and such factors as racial discrimination and family size,
the options available to them would still be obviously greater than,
say, in the case of public housing projects as the targeted destinat-
ion of resources for resolving low-income housing problems. Rent
allowances would facilitate the dispersal of low income families,
giving them a 'low profile' and thereby tend to generate public
acceptance of the relocation of the poor to neighborhoods where
amenities might be greater than in the areas they vacated. Rent allow-
ances would provide for greater mobility among low-income families
than in the case of such schemes as home purchase, where the poor
family might be commited strongly to one location of residence re-
gardless of shifts in locations of job opportunities or changes in
family size.
One variation of the rent allowance scheme, as suggested by Irving
Welfeld, is a sliding scale of allowances, hinged not only to income
levels but to the percentage of income expended by families on rent.
The greater the share of gross income expended by a poor family, as
a demonstration of the seriousness of its intent to obtain decent
housing, the larger the government supplement. Welfeld suggests that
if the program were to be directed to the estimated ten million
households in need, it might cost from five to ten billion dollars
annually. This compares favorably with the annual expenditures
over recent past years of nearly four billion dollars, on average,
for the existing collection of inefficient programs. It is likely
that the percentage of total costs devoted to administration under a
scheme of housing allowances to occupants would be substantially less
than under alternative programs. In the case of housing allowances
to occupants, an 'invisible' means test to determine the eligibility
of each applicant could be run through income tax records. Computer-
ized, this system for processing applications could prove to be quite
economical. Public agencies would not have to assume burdens involv-
ed in construction, operation or even approval of housing units.
Each low-income consumer of housing would have the prerogative of
choosing the housing unit that consumer considers must suitable
within the constraints of income plus housing allowance supplement. 24
Conceivably, reinforcement of the allocation of supplements for
housing, rather than for other goods and services, might be instru-
mented by the issuance of vouchers rather than cash. The vouchers
would be transferable only for housing.
Rent allowances to occupants encounter some limitations. As mention-
ed earlier, racial and family size factors may diminish market choices
for many. The elderly and disabled frequently require special types
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of housing to which the market, even with the incentives of rent
supplements, might find it unprofitable to respond. If a rent
allowance scheme is conducted in a localized area, such as New York
City, it may succeed in retaining the poor within the confines of
the city but it would not seem to offer any incentives for the more
affluent to stay as well. As the more affluent gravitate to the
suburbs, the ratio of poor to wealthy - and the problems of the
city - would continue to rise. An efficient rent allowance scheme
would have to be flexible, to allow for changes in the market prices
of housing as supplements were issued and the demand for higher
priced housing rose, otherwise the greater outlay by the poor for
housing might buy little more than less money had previously bought.
Required would be a system to control rises of local rents, such as
a fair rent tribunal or a flexible rent control structure.
A program of rent allowances to occupants would seem to suggest strong-
er prospects for resolving the housing problems of the poor than
would the other alternative programs explored here. In terms of a
strategy of income redistribution, rent allowances to the poor might
be palatable to the general public, since the funds could be earmark-
ed strictly for housing and specifically to those identified as in
need. Since most American families are adequately housed, it would
seem advisable to avoid inauguration of a general scheme to assist
the entire public so that the poor might also receive aid. The im-
pact of a strategy of income redistribution through housing allowanc-
es in resolving the problems of poverty is unlikely to be dramatic.
However, the resolution of housing problems through subsidies to ten-
ants may alleviate some aspects of the poverty problem with the in-
jection of relatively modest public resources. Importantly, the
spatial concentration of the poor may be lessened. The dispersal of
the poor and the resultant relief from congestion of their numbers
as they bid for housing throughout wider areas is likely to diminish
some of the droblems which tend to creat poverty cycles. For one
thing, the models and facilities available to the children of low in-
come families are likely to increase. For many of the poor, improved
access to medical and educational facilities are items of high prior-
ity. For some of the poor, enlarged employment opportunities are
part of the escape from poverty and these may be expanded by the
geographical residential dispersal of the poor. For some of the
poor, importantly including many of the elderly, economic improve-
ments are only part of the answer. Social arrangements, perhaps
incorporating carefully fostered living groups in specifically de-
signed housing, may be engineered to answer the needs of many of the
elderly. If the possibilities for dramatic solution of the problem
of poverty through tenant subsidy programs appear modest, it should
be remembered that such programs generate slight social and economic
disequilibrium since the income redistribution involved is respect-
ably small in terms of government expenditure and gross national
product. A rent allowance scheme, in conjunction with other programs
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